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I. INTRODUCTION

Rule 26(a) (1) is one of several new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that became effective December 1, 1993. It remains one of
the most controversial of the 1993 changes.
The 1993 changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
the product of a Congressional decision made three years earlier,
in response to a perceived need to reform the discovery procedures
used in the federal system. Many considered the existing procedures inefficient, excessively costly, and unnecessarily adversarial.'
As a prelude to reform, Congress enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act ("CJRA") in 1990.2 The CJRA authorized courts to establish a series of pilot programs in several federal districts, some of
which began almost immediately after the authorization. The programs were intended to experiment with projects that would "facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the merits [and] monitor discovery. " '
After less than three years of experimentation, the United
States Supreme Court perceived a need for change. In April 1993,
the Supreme Court submitted to Congress several proposed
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These proposals became effective December 1, 1993. 4 The changes were intended to encourage greater candor during the early stages of a
dispute and, consequently, provide a more efficient federal judicial
1. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (1) advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146
F.R.D. 627, 628-29 (stating the purpose of the revision is to accelerate the discovery process while reducing the paperwork involved in making discovery requests).
Professor Sorenson suggested that "[r]eform efforts, largely spurred by concerns
that litigation associated costs have become so excessive that they threaten the very
health of the national economy..." Charles W. Sorenson,Jr., Disclosure UnderFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)-"Much Ado About Nothing?' 46 HASTINGS L.J. 679,
682 (1995).
2. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1994)).
3. Id. President George Bush signed the bill into law on December 1, 1990.
On October 23, 1991, President Bush issued Executive Order 12,778 to facilitate
the process. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, pmbl., 3 C.F.R. 359, 360 (1991).
4. Rule 26(a) (1), along with other amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, was approved by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the Standing
Committee on Practice and Procedure, the Judicial Conference of the United
States, and adopted by the Supreme Court. All of the proposed changes were
transmitted to Congress on April 22, 1993 and became effective December 1,
1993, when Congress failed to take any contrary action. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1994); Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms, 146 F.R.D. 401
(April 22, 1993).
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Among the many changes was Rule 26(a) (1). The Rule requires that parties to a lawsuit voluntarily exchange certain information at the outset of litigation.6
Controversy, however, surrounded Rule 26(a) (1). As a result,
the drafters allowed each federal district court, by local rule or order, to exempt itself from coverage in all cases or categories of
cases in which the Rule was involved Minnesota declined this option. Instead, it is among a minority of federal districts that chose
to implement the Rule.8 The Rule contains another exemption
5. The Federal Rules Advisory Committee indicated the primary purpose of
the changes was to "accelerate the exchange of basic information about the case
and to eliminate the paper work involved in requesting such information." FED. R.
Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's notes, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 627, 627-28 (1993).
6. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a) (1) provides:
(1) Initial Disclosures. Except to the extent otherwise stipulated or directed by order or local rule, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery
request, provide to other parties: (A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularly in
the pleadings, identifying the subjects of the information; (B) a copy of,
or a description by category and location of, all documents, data compilations, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of the
party that are relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the
pleadings; (C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the
disclosing party, making available for inspection and copying as under
Rule 34 the documents or other evidentiary material, not privileged or
protected from disclosure, on which such computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered; and
(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement under which any person carrying on an insurance business may be
liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the
judgment. Unless otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, these disclosures shall be made at or within 10 days after the meeting of the parties under subdivision (f). A party shall make its initial disclosures based
on the information then reasonably available to it and is not excused
from making its disclosures because it has not fully completed its investigation of the case or because it challenges the sufficiency of another
party's disclosures or because another party has not made its disclosures.

Id.
7. Rule 26(a)(1) provides that automatic disclosure applies "except to the
extent otherwise... directed by court order or local rule." Id.
8. In 1994, Rule 26(a) (1) had been rejected by at least 52 federal courts. See
Donna Stienstra & William G. Young, Implementation of Disclosures in FederalDistrict
Courts, with Specific Attention to Courts' Responses to Selected Amendments to FederalRule
of Civil Procedure 26, C921 ALI-ABA 765, 776 (1994). A study conducted by the
Federal Judicial Center also indicated that 52 districts had opted out of Rule
26(a) (1), while 37 had adopted the Rule. See Edward D. Cavanaugh, Mandatory
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provision, which essentially allows lawyers to "opt out" of its coverage by stipulation.9 Part II of this Article contains an explanation of
this option.
Part II of this Article also contains a brief description of the
background, nature, and scope of the Rule. In Part III, this Article
discusses the controversy that surrounded the mandatory disclosure
provision. Part IV assesses the impact of Rule 26(a) (1) in the District of Minnesota four years after its promulgation.' ° Part V responds to many of the claims made by the critics of the Rule in an
effort to block its adoption. It does so by analyzing two surveys provided to the Minnesota bench and bar regarding Rule 26(a) (1).
Finally, Part VI provides answers to many of the preexisting
and current questions surrounding Rule 26(a) (1). For example, it
is clear that Rule 26(a) (1) did not generate confusion or throw the
existing judicial system into a chaotic state, as some critics had
forecast. The Rule has proved manageable and, in general, appears to be working well in the District of Minnesota. There is evidence that the Rule has made a positive impact on the practice of
law within this district.
The data upon which this Article is based comes from two
sources. The first is an attorney and litigant survey commissioned
by the Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Group for the District of
Minnesota in 1996. The second is a survey of the federal judges
and judicial magistrates in the District of Minnesota conducted by
the author during November and December of 1997. The author
expresses his appreciation for the cooperation of the Minnesota
judiciary in this effort.
II. NATURE AND SCOPE OF RULE 26(A) (1)

Rule 26(a) (1) contains a surprising number of technical requirements and definitions. This section of the Article summarily
outlines those requirements and definitions.
Disclosure's Voluntary Reality, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 21, 1994, at 15.
9. Rule 26(a) (1) provides that automatic disclosure applies "[e]xcept to the
extent otherwise stipulated .... " Id.
10. For a critical commentary regarding the changes to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, see Ralph K Winter, In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L.
REV. 263 (1992). Some committee members and Federal CircuitJudge Winter described the amendments as "barely non-trivial" or "incremental," claiming that
they "require disclosure of nothing that is not mandatory under the present rules."
See id. at 271. For a more detailed historical sketch of the changes leading up to
new Rule 26 (a) (1), see Sorenson, supranote 1, at 690-720.
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A. Automatic Disclosure
Rule 26(a) (1) requires automatic disclosure of certain information that was previously produced only when lawyers made formal discovery requests." The automatic disclosure provisions are
linked to Rule 26(f), which is a provision that mandates a prediscovery meeting between the parties' lawyers before a scheduling
conference is held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b).
B. Timing
Automatic disclosures must be made at or within ten days after
the mandatory Rule 26(f) meeting, which must occur no later than
fourteen days before the Rule 16(b) order is entered. 2 During the
Rule 26(f) meeting, the attorneys for each party must clarify issues
related to the automatic disclosures, and they must prepare a disclosure and discovery plan to submit to the court before the Rule
16(b) order is entered.13 Final adjustments to the Rule 26(a) (1)
disclosures may be made by the judge during the Rule 16(b) conference. 14
C. Purpose
Three reasons are usually provided to support the mandatory
discovery provisions found in Rule 26(a) (1). First, early discovery
"help [s] focus the discovery that is needed by the parties, and facilitate their preparation for trial or settlement."'5 Second, early discovery provides the parties to the litigation with a reasonable basis
upon which to decide the need for depositions. It also gives the
parties an opportunity to identify which, if any, documents may be
necessary to the lawsuit. Third, the early discovery mandate provides an opportunity for the parties to share information. This
mandate intends to help the parties frame their subsequent
docu1 6
ment requests in a manner "likely to avoid squabbles.
The Rule is designed to accelerate the exchange of basic information about a dispute and eliminate some of the usual paper11. See supranote 5.
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) & 26(f).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D.
at 629-30.
16. Id. at 630.
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work involved in requesting such information. The Advisory
Committee responsible for the Rule observed that it should be applied "with common sense in light17of the principles of Rule 1 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."'
D. ReasonableInquiry

Before providing Rule 26(a) (1) disclosures, a party must make
a "reasonable inquiry. "18 What constitutes a "reasonable inquiry"
depends on the circumstances of each case. Consideration must be
given to the following factors: (1) the complexity and number of
issues alleged with particularity in the pleadings; (2) the location,
number and availability of the witnesses and documents; (3) the
amount of time the party has to conduct the inquiry; and (4) the
extent of the working relationship between the disclosing party and
the party's lawyer, particularly in handling similar litigation. 9 It is
clear that the Rule does not "require
an exhaustive investigation at
20
this early stage of a legal dispute."

A party cannot postpone providing information it possesses either because it has not completed its investigation, or because the
other party has not completed its disclosures.2 1 There is, of course,
a duty to supplement initial disclosure at "appropriate intervals"
if
2
incorrect.
or
incomplete
materially
is
disclosed
information
E. Witnesses

The disclosing party must automatically disclose all witnesses
who possess discoverable information relevant to the disputed facts
that are alleged with particularity in the pleadings. This is always
required "whether or not their testimony will be supportive of the
position of the disclosing party." 23 The advantage of such a provision to the judicial system is obvious.

17. Id. at 631. Rule 1 states in relevant part, "these rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts... and shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
FED. R. Crv. P. 1.
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1).
19. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (1) advisory committee's note.
20. Id.
21. SeeFED. R. CIv. P. 26(a) (1).
22. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(e).

23.

FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (1) (A) advisory committee's note.
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F. Documents

Subsection (a) (1) (B) requires that the parties disclose copies
or descriptions of relevant documents in their custody or control 4
Parties must provide the nature and location of potentially relevant
documents and records so opposing parties can make an informed
decision concerning which of the listed documents might need to
be examined. Document information should be provided in a fashion that will avoid subsequent disagreements over the words or descriptions used.2 5 Furthermore, all relevant documents should be
disclosed regardless of whether or not they support the disclosing
party's case.26
G. ComputingDamages

Subsection (a) (1) (C) requires that a party disclose the computation of all claimed damages and make available for inspection or
copying all supporting discoverable documentation regarding
damages. 27 A party does not, of course, have to disclose a calculation of damages if this can only be accomplished by using information that is in the possession of the adversary.
H. Insurance Policies

Subsection (a) (1) (D) requires a party to automatically provide
copies of insurance policies or allow the other parties to inspect the
policies.2 Unlike subsection (a) (1) (B), both subsection (a) (1) (C)
and (D) require the actual production of documents and not
29
merely a description of the documents and their location.
I. Form

Rule 26(a) disclosures must be made in writing, served on the
24. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a) (1) (B).
25. See id. advisory committee's note.
26. See id.
27. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1)(C). The supporting information must be
made available as though a request had been made under Rule 34. See id. advisory
committee's note. The obligation only applies to information that is not privileged or protected as work product. See id. Further, as with all disclosures required under Rule 26(a), the scope is limited to information reasonably available

to the party at this early stage of the proceeding. See id.
28. SeeFED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(D).
29.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (1) (C) & (D) advisory committee's note.
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other parties, and filed with the court.0 The disclosures must be
signed by the party's lawyer or, if unrepresented, by the pro se party
herself."' By signing the disclosures, the attorney or the pro se party
is certifying that the disclosure is complete and correct as of the
time made."2
J Modifying or Suspending
The disclosure obligations contained in Rule 26(a) (1) can be
modified or suspended by stipulation of the parties, court order, or
local rule.33 Consequently, parties may agree to waive or modify
disclosures, and judges may modify or suspend the disclosure requirement on a case-by-case basis.
III. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE

The mandatory disclosure provisions of Rule 26(a) (1) were
controversial.3 4 These provisions, however, received strong support
from the Federal Judicial Center. The Federal Judicial Center ultimately was successful in urging adoption of the amendments both
before the Supreme Court and Congress even though a large segment of the bench and bar vigorously and vocally stood against their
adoption.5 Of the 264 written submissions to the Judicial Center on
the proposed rule amendments, 251 reportedly opposed the
amendments. 36 When the Court transmitted the proposed amendments to Congress, Associate Justice Scalia appended a dissenting
opinion sharply criticizing the disclosure requirements of Rule
26(a) (1).37
Justice Scalia, who was joined by Justices Souter and Thomas,
characterized the proposed rule changes as "potentially disastrous,"
30. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(a) (4).
31. SeeFED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(4) & 26 (g)(1).
32. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) (1).
33. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (1) advisory committee notes.
34. See Symposium, Reinventing Civil Litigation:EvaluatingProposals For Change,
59 BROOK. L. REv. 655 (1993).
35. Reinette Cooper Dreyfuss, Speech at the 1994 annual meeting of the
American Association of Law School Civil Procedure and Litigation Sections Seminar on Amended Rule 26; Randall Samborn, New Discovery Rules Take Effect, NAT'L
L.J., Dec. 6, 1993, at 3.
36. Alfred W. Cortese & Kathleen L. Blaner, A Change In the Rules Draws Fire,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 18, 1993, at 25.
37. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 501, 510-12
(April 22, 1993) (Scalia, J., with Thomas & SouterJJ., dissenting).
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and stated that they were likely to increase, rather than diminish,
the discovery burdens of the district courts."8 He charged that the
disclosure mechanism undermined the traditional adversary
method of civil litigation to the extent that it required counsel to
do work on behalf of their opponents." Moreover, he argued that
the discovery changes were "premature" in light of the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990, 40 which required that each federal district
court craft a Delay and Expense Reduction Plan.4"
Other legal luminaries, such as former United States Attorney
General Griffin Bell, weighed in against the disclosure provisions.
He contended that mandatory disclosure "will not correct the dysit somefunction [within the civil justice discovery system], nor 4will
3
how transform the system into a model of cooperation.
Critics charged that the Rule clashed with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 To support their claim, they cited
38. Id. at 510 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
39. Id.
40. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1994)); see generally EdwinJ. Wesely, The CivilJustice Reform Act; The Rules Enabling Act; The Amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
CIRA Plans; Rule 83-What Trumps What?, 154 F.R.D. 563 (1994); Carl Tobias, Civil
Justice Reform Roadmap, 142 F.R.D. 507 (1992); Carl Tobias, CivilJustice Reform and
the Balkanization of FederalCivil Procedure,24 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1393, 1402-03 (1992).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1994).
42. See, e.g., Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to
Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1992) (stating that many trial judges, litigants, and lawyers opposed the 1990 proposal of the Advisory Committee to include provisions
for automatic disclosure in the Federal Rules and suggested the proposal be modified or withdrawn); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: MandatoryInformal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 822-28 (1991) (outlining
criticisms made by public interest lawyers of an earlier draft of the amendments);
Administration Opposes New DisclosureRule, NAT'L L.J., July 26, 1993, at 5 (indicating
that the ABA Board of Governors was opposed to the Rule 26(a) (1) automatic disclosure provision); Federal Courts, ABA Denounces New Discovery Rule; Urges Congress to
Reject Amendments, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES; REGULATION, ECONOMICS AND
LAW (BNA) Section A, Aug. 16, 1993, at 156.
43. Bell, supra note 42, at 3. Bell's article is cited by Justice Scalia in his dissent to the Rule 26 amendments. See also Virginia E. Hench, Mandatory Disclosure
and Equal Access to Justice: The 1993 FederalDiscovery Rules and Amendments and the
Just, Speedy and Inexpensive Determination of Every Action, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 179, 209
(1994) (stating that "[b]esides adding another layer to the existing discovery structure, the 1993 amended rules, like their predecessors, leave untouched (and may
even encourage) such common discovery abuses as over-response to legitimate
discovery requests, evasive or misleading responses, frivolous objections to requests
for discovery, and failure to respond, which have frequently been directed by the
party with greater resources against the party with fewer resources").
44. See Shilpa Shah, Note, An Application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a)(1) to Section 1983 Actions: Does Rule 26(a)(1) Violate the Rules EnablingAct? 43
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the language found in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules, which indicates
that a pleader need only make a "short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." 5 They argued
that the Rule 26 mandatory disclosure provisions were philosophically contrary to Rule 8 because Rule 26 requires disclosure of information based upon facts that are "alleged with particularity in
the pleadings." 46 Eventually, they said, the impact of Rule 26 would
lead to an end of notice pleading, as we know it today.
Cost was often at the forefront of the proposed rule changes
debate. Many claimed that the proposed changes would require
lawyers to make massive and expensive disclosures initially or risk
sanctions from the court. As a consequence, went the argument,
the costs associated with this early mandatory discovery would increase the client's litigation bill.
Some complained that the courts are too lenient with parties,
particularly defendants, who already failed to comply with existing
rules. The implication was that defendants could not be forced to
cooperate in turning over information required by the Rules. Furthermore, it was claimed that defendants would "get away with it"
because of thejudiciary's existing lax attitude.47
Battle-hardened trial lawyers sparred over whether defendants
or plaintiffs received the greatest advantage under the proposed
Rule. Defense lawyers were convinced that Rule 26 automatically
provided plaintiffs with the advantage. They rested their argument
on a belief that plaintiffs carefully prepare their cases before filing
a complaint. Therefore, the additional preparation time provided
under the proposed changes, they argued, affords the Plaintiff an
advantage because he or she can spend months drafting and investigating a claim before preparing and serving a complaint. A defendant, in contrast, has far less time to investigate and prepare because of the limitations placed on providing a response by the
Federal Rules. Even more, other disclosures were criticized because they would unnecessarily increase overall costs due to the additional time the mandated discovery requirements placed on at115, 124 n.69 (1995) (quotingJ. Stratton Shartel, Litigators Voice
Numerous Objections to ProposedDiscovery Rule Changes, INSIDE LMG., Dec. 1992, at
CLEv. ST. L. REv.

25).
45. See FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a).
46. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (1) (A).
47. But see FJC Report Finds More Districts Embracing Rule 26 (a)(1), FED.
DIscOvERY NEWS, June 1997.
48. See id.
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torneys.
A few weak voices claimed that Rule 26(a) (1) was inconsistent
with the formal operation of the work product doctrine and inimical to its primary purpose of encouraging attorney preparation.
However, support for this proposition was slight. There were also
claims that the Rule violated ethical duties to the client, but the arguments were not seriously pursued.
It was against this backdrop of criticism and pessimism that the
Rules were adopted. This Article is written against the same backdrop. As the Rule went into effect in several districts across the nation, it became clear that many, if not most, of the fears expressed
by the opponents were unfounded.
IV. THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA'S RESPONSE TO THE NEW RULE

The Federal District Court of Minnesota responded to the new
discovery rules shortly after Rule 26(a) (1) was promulgated. This
initial response came in a memorandum sent by former Chief
Judge Diana Murphy to the judges and magistrates in the District.
She stated that the new rule changes "clearly apply to all proceedings commenced on or after December 1, 1993, and they apply to
all pending proceedings, 'insofar as just and practicable.'" 50 The
question of continued applicability was then referred to the Local
Federal District Court Rules Committee to review and recommend
whether the District should "opt out" of any of the revisions.
The Local Rules Committee met and considered whether to
opt out of the Rule 26 pre-discovery mandatory disclosure requirements. It concluded that the Federal District Court of Minne49. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges' Self-Interest and Procedural Rules:
Comment on Macey, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 647, 656 (1994) (guessing at what should be
disclosed results in breach of a lawyer's ethical obligations to his or her clients);
Alfred W. Cortese, Jr., & Kathleen L. Blaner, CivilJustice Reform in America: A Question of Parity with Our InternationalRivals, 13 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 1, 45-46 (1992)
(stating that disclosure forces lawyer to do opponent's work); See also Amendments
to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,146 F.R.D. 507, 511 (April 22, 1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). The obligation to disclose damaging information in context requiring application of considerable judgment "would place intolerable strain upon
lawyers' ethical duty to represent their clients and not to assist the opposing side."

Id. "Requiring a lawyer to make a judgment as to what information is 'relevant to
disputed facts' plainly requires him to use his professional skills in the service of
the adversary." Id.
50. Memorandum from former ChiefJudge Diana Murphy on the changes to
Rule 26(a)(1) to the judges and magistrates of the Federal District Court of Minnesota (1993) (on file with author).
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sota had largely been operating under the amended Federal Rules
"without reported controversy or complications."5 Therefore, it
recommended that the District adopt the Rule while exempting
only certain categories of cases from it.5
In response to the Committee recommendations, the District
Court adopted Rule 26(a) (1) with the recommended reservations.
The reservations exempted from application of Rule 26(a) (1) include: (1) litigants involved in class actions under Rule 23; (2) pro se
prisonerand other pro se litigants; (3) cases consolidated with a case
in which the parties have already met as required under Rule 26(f)
or in which a scheduling order under Rule 16(b) has been entered;
(4) cases transferred to the Court under 28 U.S.C. Section 1407 or
consolidated with cases so transferred; (5) cases subject to potential
transfer to another Court under 28 U.S.C. Section 1407; and (6)
cases transferred or removed to the Court more than thirty days after commencement of the case.53
The District adopted Rule 26 with minor reservations. Yet, it
was concerned about the long-term impact of the Rule on practice
in the District and was uneasy about the unanswered charges made
by its critics.
V. THE DISTRICT'S ATrORNEYAND LITIGANT SURVEY

The District's Attorney and Litigant Survey has its roots in a
decision made in August 1993, when the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota adopted a Civil Expense and
Delay Reduction Plan as directed by the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990 ("CJRA"). 54 In response to the CJRA and as required by 28
51.

1996 ATroRNEY AND LITIGANT SURVEY PROJECr 33 [hereinafter MINNESOTA

SURVEY].
52. See D. MINN. R. CIv. P. 26.1 (a) (1) (A)-(G). The Committee supporters of
the Rule suggested that the timely exchange of detailed reports would discourage
parties from "bluffing" about their claims or defenses until the eleventh hour.
Moreover, the exchange of detailed expert reports would encourage more prompt
settlements. Opponents expressed concern that the Rule would significantly and
needlessly increase the cost of discovery for a substantial proportion of lawsuits by
requiring both a detailed report and a subsequent expert deposition. Opponents
also argued that the Rule made it more difficult to find persons willing to act as
experts. See id.
53. See id. The Local Rules Committee determined that Rule 26 required
more technical knowledge than that possessed by a pro se party or a prisoner. In
class action cases, the Local Committee noted that the Rule might unnecessarily
complicate an already complicated proceeding. See id.
54. MINNESOTA SURVEY, supra note 51, at 1. This Article has not incorporated
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U.S.C. Section 475, a CJRA Advisory Group was assembled to conduct an assessment of the CJRA Plan for the District. The Group
consisted of members of the bar and the public, all of whom were
appointed by the District Court. The Advisory Group intended to
determine what, if any, additional action would reduce cost and delay in civil litigation and improve management practices of the
court. It was a part of this undertaking that the District initiated a
survey project in 1995-96 to determine the impact of the new
rules.56
The survey was sent to a random selection of attorneys who
represented clients in cases filed after August 1993 and closed during the period of June 1, 1994 to March 18, 1996."7 The survey instrument for this project was a mailed, self-addressed questionnaire. 5 Questionnaires were
sent to 900 attorneys with a total
59
response rate of 74 percent.
The survey requested a broad range of responses, covering almost all of the various new rule provisions. The preparation of this
Article, however, focused on using data related specifically to Rule
26(a) (1).
A. Should the District "Opt" Out of Rule 26(a)(1)?

The survey asked the lawyer respondents practicing in the District to provide their opinion about opting out of the mandatory
disclosure requirements.6 0 Not surprisingly, this question elicited
the strongest emotions from the lawyer respondents. The survey's
Reporter noted that this particular question had many comments
•61
written in the margin either in favor or against the disclosures.
the portion of the survey dedicated to litigant responses.
55. See id.
56. See id. The scope of the survey was much broader than the scope of this
article because the survey attempted to assess the impact of all the 1993 Rule
changes.
57. See id.
58. The survey instrument was designed by Anderson, Niebuhr and Associates, an independent survey firm based in Minneapolis, Minnesota. This type of
instrument was selected because of its ability to capture opinions from a larger
population than telephone interviews or focus groups. See id.
59. See id. The survey was sent to a random selection of attorneys who represented clients in cases filed after August, 1993 and closed between June, 1994, and
March 18, 1996.
60.

MINNESOTA SURVEY,

supranote 51, at 33.

61. See id. at 11. Dean Harry Haynsworth, William Mitchell College of Law,
St. Paul, Minnesota, was the reporter for the project.
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The graph in Figure 1 shows the number of lawyer responses
to this question and the strength of the lawyer's opinion to "opt
out" or not. Obviously, after four years of experience with the
Rule, no consensus exists among the respondents regarding the efficacy of opting out. Slightly more than half the respondents were
either neutral or believed the District should not "opt out" of the
Rule.
The survey instrument attempted to gain additional insight
from the responses by separating the "opt out" question into two
tables. The first table, Figure 2, assessed the strength of an individual's response to the "opt out" question by grouping the lawyer respondents by "number of cases filed." The second table, Figure 3,
grouped the lawyer respondents' reactions to the "opt out" question according to years of experience. Both of these tables are reproduced below.

of the
Figure 1: The District Should Opt Out
2
FRCP26(A) Requirements

The District Should Opt-out of the FRCP 26(a) Requirenients
300
200
23%

1oo

Strongly Agree

62.

5%23%
17%

U

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

See id. at 33.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss2/6

14

Oliphant:
Four Years
of Experience
withPROCEDURE
Rule 26(A)(1): The
Rule is Alive an
FEDERAL
RULE
OF CIVIL
26(A)(1)

1998]

3
Figure 2: Number of Cases Filea

Civil cases
filed since
August

Number
The District Court should opt-out of the FRCP 26(a)
of Attor- initial pre-discovery mandatory disclosure requirements
neys

1993

Strongly I
Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree Strongl

Disagree

1-5 cases

275

19%

28%

19%

24%

10%

6-10 cases

138

19%

23%

17%

21%

9%

11-15 cases

53

26%

15%

19%

21%

19%

16-20 cases

26

27%

23%

8%

31%

12%

21-30 cases

13

31%

23%

8%

39%

-0-

3140 cases

3

-0-

33%

-0-

33%

33%

41-50 cases

6

17%

33%

17%

-0-

33%

51 and

8

-0-

25%

0%

38%

38%

above

According to Figure 2, lawyers who have filed the largest number of cases in the District (fifty-one and above) comprise the
group that most strongly believes the District should not "opt out."
Seventy-six percent of the lawyers in that group indicated approval
of the Rule while fifty-four percent of lawyers who have handled
twenty-one to thirty cases believe the District should "opt out."
There is not an immediate explanation for the apparent disagreement between these groups. However, it is possible that the lawyers
handling the largest caseloads in the District have concluded from
their extensive experience with the Rule that it is a useful tool in
the early stages of the dispute resolution process.
The following table shows the breakdown of responses from

lawyer respondents by years of experience. 64

63.
64.

See id. at 34.
See id. at 35.
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Figure 3: Years Practicingas an Attorney

Years
Number
practicing of Atas an at- torneys

The District Court should opt-out of the FRCP
26(a) initial pre-discovery mandatory disclosure
requirements

torney

Strongly
Agree

Agree
I

INeutralT
I

Disagree

I

Strongly
I Disagree

1-5 years

76

13%

24%

15%

26%

22%

6-10 years

111

22%

25%

21%

24%

8%

11-15 year

105

24%

27%

12%

27%

11%

16-20 year

97

18%

27%

20%

29%

7%

21-25 years

67

33%

24%

16%

15%

12%

26-30 year

42

31%

24%

19%

17%

10%

31-35 years

17

35%

29%

12%

18%

6%

36-40 year

8

38%

13%

38%

13%

-0-

1-35 year

3

33%

-0-

33%

-0-

33%

6-50yea

2

-0-

50%

50%

-0-

-0-

In general, it appears that the more years a lawyer has practiced in the District, the greater the opposition to Rule 26. Fortyeight percent of the lawyers with one to five years of experience in
the District favored retaining the mandatory provisions in Rule
26(a). However, sixty-four percent of those lawyers with thirty-one
to thirty-five years in the District held a belief that the District
should "opt out." A number of possibilities exist to explain this result.
It may be that those lawyers supporting the Rule are fairly recent law school graduates. In their more recent law school training, these lawyers almost certainly have been exposed to a variety of
dispute resolution models other than the traditional adversarial
one, i.e., mediation and arbitration.65 It is just as probable that the
65.

See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, To Solve Problems, Not Make Them: Integrat-
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more-experienced lawyers were trained in an academic setting that
relied almost exclusively upon the traditional adversarial model of
dispute resolution. Rule 26(a) (1) requires an attitude of cooperation and a spirit of conciliation. Therefore, it is fair to assume that
it would find greater acceptance from a group whose training was
more philosophically in tune with the Rule than those law school
graduates who received training twenty or more years ago.66
There are other conceivable explanations for the differing reactions to the Rule. Possibly, the more experienced lawyers find
that cooperation 'Just doesn't work" because the adversary perceives cooperation as weakness and attempts to take an unfair advantage. As a result, cooperation and conciliation increase rather
than decrease the problems in resolving a case. It is just too risky.
Another explanation is that the opponents have become very familiar with the existing system and are generally opposed to any significant change.
Overall, forty-eight percent of the respondents believe that the
District should "opt out" of the Rule. The 1996 survey report notes
that "[n]o other question in this survey had such an even distribution of responses across the scale."67
Figure 4: The InitialPre-discovery Disclosure
Required by Rule 26(a) (Cost)
le initial pre-discovery discisures required by Rule 26(a) (cost)

E
400
300

0= 200

23

U

25%

~2

0

Increased Cost

26%

No Effect

Decreased Cost

No Opinion

ing ADR in the Law School Curriculum,46 SMU L. REV. 1995, 1995 (1993); Elizabeth
R. Kosier, Mediation in Nebraska: An Innovative Past, a SpiritedPresent, and a Provocative Future, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 183, 204 (1997) (stating that "lawyers who have
been involved in mediation are more willing to encourage its use again").
66. Unfortunately, the data from the survey did not collect responses by law
school graduate date.
67. MINNESOTA SURVEY, supranote 51, at 33.
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B. Has The Rule Increased Costs?
As the above chart indicates, forty-three percent of the lawyers
responding to this question in the survey concluded that the disclosures required by Rule 26(a) have increased costs. Twenty-six percent of the respondents believed the Rule has decreased litigation
costs while another one-quarter believed it had no effect on cost.6
Unfortunately, no data exists to explain the claimed cost increase.
Furthermore, there is no data that indicates how much the costs actually increased. One suspects that increased costs may be associated with lawyer attitude, but the data does not support that suspi69
cion.
Figure 5: The InitialPre-DiscoveryDisclosures
Required by Rule 26(a)(Time)'0
The inik

pre-discovery disclosures required by Rule 26(a) (tir)

400O

300
45%
32%

S200323

1

0-

Increased Time

t

No Effect

,

Decreased Timne

,

No Opinion

C. Has the Neu, Rule Increased the Time and Cost to Dispose of a Case?
As the above chart indicates, thirty-five percent of the lawyers
believe that disposition time has been decreased, and only fifteen
68.

See id. at 11. One respondent stated that

"[ d ]

efendants are not disclosing
adequately." Another said "I have yet to see anyone comply with the new rules
concerning disclosure and discovery of expert testimony." Id. at 12. A third stated
that "[t~he Rule 26(a) mandatory disclosure requirements, while requiring extra
work, do not produce productive information and result in increased cost because
of increased numbers of motions to compel and early discovery disputes!!" Id. A
fourth observed that such a rule "gives an advantage to 'disagreeable' counsel at
expense of clients." Id. On a positive note, one respondent said that "[a]s an in-

tellectual property lawyer I practice all over the country in the federal courts and I
have sought to convince opposing counsel to follow new 26 even if the court has
opted out." Id.
69. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Thirteenth Chronicle: Legal Formalism and
Law's Discontents, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1122-23 (stating that focusing in law
school on borderline cases fosters a litigator's mentality.)

70.

MINNESOTA SURVEY,supra note

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss2/6

51, at 11.
18

19981

Oliphant:
Four Years
of Experience
with
Rule 26(A)(1): The
Rule is Alive an
FEDERAL
RULE
OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
26(A)(1)

percent of the respondents believe the Rule has increased disposition time. These responses are interesting because they fail to support the cost data discussed earlier. One would expect that if fortythree percent of the respondents believe the Rule has increased
their costs, then the increased cost would be reflected in longer
disposition time. Surprisingly, however, there is no such correlation.
VI. THEJUDICIAL SURVEY
In November and December of 1997, a survey of sitting judges
and magistrates in the Minnesota District was undertaken. The
survey instrument was a mailed, self-administered questionnaire
with a total of eighteen questions. The questions were written with
a variety of scales to measure the attitudes and perceptions of the
judiciary. Nine members of the judiciary completed the survey.
Participation in the survey was voluntary and individual responses were promised anonymity. Retired judges and judicial
magistrates were not included in the survey.
A. Should the District "Opt Out"?
There was little disagreement among the bench on this question. While forty-eight percent of the lawyer respondents believed
the District should "opt out" of the Rule, only one of nine members
of the judiciary responding to the question believed that the District should "opt out" of the Rule.7 It is relatively clear that the
weight of experience in the District lies on the side of continuing
with the Rule.
B. Has Rule 26(a) Promoted Early Settlements?

Unfortunately, the lawyers who were surveyed were not asked
this question. It would have been helpful to compare their responses to those of the judiciary.
The survey data indicates that the judiciary perceives that Rule
26(a) has allowed parties to accelerate their evaluation of the case,

71. In your opinion, and given your
the Rule, this district should have "opted
Strongly Agree
5 4
Responses:
0 1
AvERAGE:
1.88
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and that it has promoted earlier settlements" This perception, if
reflective of reality, strongly suggests that the Rule has moved the
District toward more efficient disposition of cases.
C. Has the Rule Had a GeneralPositiveEffect on Litigation?
This question was also not directed to the lawyer respondents.
However, the District judges responding to it believed that Rule
26 (a) has had a positive impact on litigation in the District." Furthermore, they believe that its74 overall impact has improved the
quality ofjustice in the District.
D. Speedy Evaluation?
The judges and magistrates also believed that the Rule has enabled lawyers to more speedily evaluate their cases and avoid wasteful activity.7 5
VII. CONCLUSION

It is clear that the opponents of Rule 26(a) were overly pessimistic in their forecasts. The two studies in this District, for example, fail to seriously support the suggestions made by Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Souter that the 1993 changes are "potentially disastrous." 76 To the contrary, the surveys support the conclusion that
72. In your opinion, Rule 26(a) has allowed parties to speed up their evaluation of the case and thereby promoted earlier settlements.
Strongly Agree
5 4 3 2 1
Strongly disagree
Responses:
17 10 0
AVERAGE:
4.0
73. In your opinion, the new provisions of Rule 26(a) have had a positive impact on litigation in this circuit because it has resulted in earlier settlements.
Strongly Agree
5 4 3 2 1 Strongly disagree
Responses:
15 2 1 0
AvERAGE:

3.66

74. In your opinion, overall impact of Rule 26(a) has been to improve the
quality ofjustice in this district.
Strongly Agree
5 4 3 2 1 Strongly disagree
Responses:
25 2 0 0
AVERAGE:
4.0
75. In your opinion, Rule 26(a) has allowed parties to speed up their evaluation of the case and thereby promoted earlier settlements.
Strongly Agree
5 4 3 2 1 Strongly disagree
Responses:
17 10 0
AvERAGE:

76.

4.0

See supra note 38.
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after four years of experience the Rule is working well, although
not perfectly, in this District.
The experience of the judiciary in this District has led its
members to almost unanimously support the Rule. The Local
Rules Committee has reported that Rule 26 is operating "without
reported controversy or complications.""
No evidence has emerged to support a view that the traditional
adversarial process in the District has been undermined or that
Rule 26(a) has caused counsel to do work on behalf of their opponents.78 Likewise, there is no evidence suggesting that the Rule has
had an adverse impact on the "notice" philosophy contained in
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or that unanticipated "massive and expensive disclosures" were the result. 9 There
is no evidence to support the claims that the Rule has resulted in
an improper invasion of the Work Product Doctrine.
Members of the judiciary are the Rule's strongest supporters
and firmly believe that the Rule is fostering more efficient disposition of cases and has improved the quality of justice in the District.
It would be hard to find a healthier endorsement of a controversial
rule than that coming from the judiciary.
There is a clear division between the lawyers with a great deal
of experience in the District and those with five years or less, which
may be the result of several factors. First, the less-experienced
group of lawyer respondents likely consists of more female lawyers
who may view conciliation and cooperation with greater favor than
male respondents who have twenty-plus years of experience with
the adversarial method. Second, the less-experienced group of
lawyer respondents may have been exposed to alternative dispute
resolution in their law school training, which may account for their
positive reaction to Rule 26(a). Third, the more-experienced
group may be adhering to the traditional approach to problem
solving because they are familiar with it and prefer no change.
Unfortunately, the lawyer survey data did not control for gender, date of graduation from law school, or ask any information
about law school training. Future assessments, if made, should attempt to collect this information.
The result of the lawyer survey regarding litigation costs is puzzling and needs further exploration. One would expect a correla77.

See id.

78.
79.

See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
Id.
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tion in the lawyer responses that would link the increased costs,
which were reported by forty-three percent of the respondents,
with increased disposition time. However, with only fifteen percent
of the lawyer respondents reporting that Rule 26(a) has increased
the disposition time, there is no correlation.
The formulation and response to the cost question in the lawyer survey is also not as helpful as one would hope because it fails to
collect data on how much the Rule may have increased costs
among those lawyers reporting an increase. Finally, while the Rule
may not have transformed the system "into a model of cooperation,"80 there isevidence that it has had the effect of encouraging
cooperative behavior among lawyers in the District.
The District should consider concentrating its efforts to foster
cooperation and conciliation in the use and application of Rule 26
among the new lawyers practicing in the District. Programs should
include discussions of the technical requirements of Rule 26(a)
and the District's philosophical commitment to cooperation and
conciliation among lawyers practicing within it.
The experience in the Minnesota District after four years provides hope and support to other Districts in the United States that
are considering implementing Rule 26, either in whole or in part.
This District has benefited from the Rule and apparently intends to
benefit even more from it in the future. The wall of negativity
erected by the opponents of this Rule has fallen in light of the last
four years of experience.

" See supra note 43.
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